Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 2
The Second Circuit Review - 1990-1991 Term

Article 5

2-1-1992

CONFLICT OF LAWS: The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: Whose Conflicts Law? Whose
Local Law? Barkanic v. General Administration of Civil
Aviation of the People's Republic of China
David E. Seidelson

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
David E. Seidelson, CONFLICT OF LAWS: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Whose Conflicts Law? Whose Local Law? Barkanic v.
General Administration of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 427 (1992).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol58/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT:
WHOSE CONFLICTS LAW? WHOSE LOCAL LAW?

BARKANIC v. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF
CIVIL AVIATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA*

David E. Seidelson**
INTRODUCTION

Peter Barkanic, domiciled in the District of Columbia, and
Donald Fox, domiciled in New Hampshire, both American businessmen contemplating a trip to China, purchased tickets for a
China Airlines flight from Nanjing to Beijing. The tickets were
purchased from a travel agent in Washington, D.C., acting on
behalf of Pan American World Airways ("Pan Am") under an
arrangement between China Airlines and Pan Am whereby the
former authorized the latter to issue tickets for passenger travel
in China.1 Barkanic and Fox died when the Chinese plane
crashed en route to Beijing. Personal representatives of their estates brought wrongful death actions against the General Administration of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China
("CAAC") in federal District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, asserting subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").2 After the United
* 923 F.2d
** Lyle T.

957 (2d Cir. 1991).
Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University. I wish to express my gratitude to David F. Hayes, Esq., counsel for the plaintiffs, and John K. Weir,
Esq., counsel for the defendant, for their kindness and graciousness in provding me with
information and documents relevant to the case. None of the assertions or conclusions
set forth in the article should be imputed to either counsel. All are the responsibility of
the author.
I Barkanic v. General Administration of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of
China, 822 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987). It was in this opinion
that the Second Circuit concluded that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1332(a)(4), 1391(b), 1441(a), 1602-1611 (1988) [hereinafter FSIAJ, gave the federal district court subject matter jurisdiction. The arrangement between China Airlines
and Pan Am was an important element in that conclusion.
2 Id.
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that such
jurisdiction was appropriate,3 the defendant asserted that its liability should be governed by Chinese municipal law that limits
an airline's liability for the wrongful death of a non-citizen to
$20,000.1 Neither the local law of the District of Columbia" nor
3 Barkanic, 822 F.2d at 13.
4 Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China,
923 F.2d 957, 958 (2d Cir. 1991). Defendant's expert witness testified to the Chinese law:
Witness: The maximum amount is twenty thousand dollars U.S. dollars which
was established according to the preference treatment and the Hague Convention pertaining to foreigners, overseas Chinese and compatriots of Hong Kong.
Q. What is the limitation of liability for Chinese nationals?
A. The maximum compensation for Chinese residents is five thousand
IB, Chinese dollars.
Q. Where in China law are those limitations set forth?
A. On December 25, 1982 and December 27, 1982 the State Council of
China issued two orders to amend the 1951 regulations on this matter.
Q. So is it your testimony that the limitations of liability in Chinese law
are found in the regulations of 1951 as they were amended in 1982, is
that correct?
A. Yes, as amended in 1982.
Hearing Transcript, Motion for Partial Summ. J., Nov. 24, 1987, at 25. Defendant's expert witness testified that Chinese conflicts law would lead to the Chinese ceiling on
recovery:
Q. Considering the fact [sic] of this case, Mr. Ze, and applying the conflict rule set forth in Article 146, what is your opinion as to what law
would be applied in this case?
A. Chinese laws.
Id. at 47.
Elaborating on the reason for having a higher ceiling for non-citizens than for citizens, defendant's expert testified:
[T]aking into consideration the living expense and the special situation of
compatriots of Hong Kong, overseas Chinese as [sic] foreigners, special principles have been, will be, will be adopted in accordance with the Hague
Convention.
These people, referring to the overseas Chinese, foreigners and compatriots of Hong Kong, will be treated with special preference in accordance with
the standards of the Hague Convention in which China is a member.
The maximum compensation for them, we are referring to compatriots of
Hong Kong, overseas Chinese and foreigners, the maximum compensation for
them is twenty thousand U.S. dollars .... [With regard to domestic passengers,] the maximum total amount for all these funds will be limited to five
thousand dollars. Chinese dollars.
Id. at 65-66.
The Witness: The present maximum compensation for compatriots of Hong
Kong, for overseas Chinese or foreigners is twenty thousand U.S. dollars ...
which is taken into consideration in the Hague Convention.
Id. at 72.
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that of New Hampshire8 would have imposed any ceiling on
recovery.
This confronted the court with a choice-of-law problem.
Which state's local law should be applied, that of China or that
of the District of Columbia in the Barkanic action, that of China
or that of New Hampshire in the Fox action? That choice-of-law
problem, in turn, raised a preliminary issue. In resolving the
choice-of-law problem, whose conflicts law should be applied,
that of China, the place where the defendant's act or omission
occurred, that of the federal court hearing the action, or that of
New York, the forum state?

The District Court... found that, as a result of an aircraft accident which
occurred in 1982 in China, the government amended its regulations to increase
compensation to foreigners involved in domestic accidents ....
Citizens of
China would be paid an amount equivalent to $1,500 U.S., while foreigners
would be compensated to a maximum of $20,000 U.S. The Court found that
the limitation was established "on the basis of favorable treatment and with
reference to the limitation set forth in the Hague Protocol [to the Warsaw
Convention] that China has acceded to."
Appellee's Brief at 8, Barkanic, 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 562, 90-7641) (footnote
omitted).
The reader interested in contemporary Chinese law generally may wish to read
Nicholas P. Hansen, The Codification of Chinese Tort Law, 5 UCLA PAcwiFc BAsiN L J.
172 (1986); Whitmore Gray et al, trans., GeneralPrinciples of Civil Lw of the People's
Republic of China, 34 Ah. J. CoimAm. L. 715 (1986).
According to the Second Circuit, "[plaintiffs did] not dispute CAACs interpretation
of Chinese law." 923 F.2d at 958 n.1.
5 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (1989).
6 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 556:12, 13, 14 (1974). Section 13 imposes a ceiling of
$50,000 "except in cases where the plaintiff's decedent has left either a widow, widower,
child, father, mother, or any relative dependent on the plaintiffs decedent in which
event there shall be no limitation." Id. at 556:13. Donald Fox, decedent, left a widow, one
of the plaintiffs in the Barkanic action. Those relatives specifically named in section 13
need not be financially dependent on the decedent for the ceiling to be inapplicable.
Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Service, Inc., 484 A.2d 1101 (N.H. 1984). Although the
New Hampshire statute is entitled a wrongful death statute, it "limits damages to the
injuries suffered by the decedent and his or her estate .... Damages are not assessed
based on the loss suffered by surviving relatives." Siciliano v. Capital City Shows, Inc.,
475 A.2d 19, 24 (N.H. 1984) (citations omitted). In effect, then, the statute is more akin
to a survival statute than to a wrongful death statute. See W. PAGE KEnToN Lr Ai, PosSER AND KETON ON THE LAW OF ToRnS §§ 125A, 126, 127, at 940.54 (5th ed. 1984). That
being the case, a question arises as to why the applicability or inapplicability of the
ceiling on recovery turns on the identity of the decedent's survivors. Perhaps the New
Hampshire legislature is content to assume that those survivors specifically named or
those survivors who are in fact dependent on the decedent are likely to share in the
decedents estate and be beneficiaries of the action. N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 556:14 (1974).
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WHOSE CONFLICTS LAW?

A.

The FSIA-FTCA Connection

CAAC argued that the FSIA mandated Jthe application of
Chinese conflicts law (which presumably would have led to the
application of Chinese local law and the $20,000 ceiling).1 CAAC
analogized the FSIA and the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA").8 Both contain similar language:
If... the law of the place where the action or omission occurred provides ... for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign state shall
be liable for actual or compensatory damages."

Since, under the FTCA, the United States Supreme Court in
Richards v. United States10 mandated application of the conflicts law of the state where the act or omission occurred, and in
light of the similar language used in the two acts, CAAC reasoned that the court should apply the conflicts
law of China.11
12
reasoning.
The district court accepted that
The Second Circuit did not follow suit. First, it noted that
the two similar provisions relate only to punitive damages-an
issue not involved in Barkanic. 3 Second, and presumably more
significant, the FTCA contains an explicit conflicts rule providing that the liability of the United States shall be determined
"in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."" It was this explicit rule that the Supreme
Court iad interpreted in Richards as requiring the application

of the conflicts law of that state. Since there is no similar explicit conflicts rule in the FSIA, the Second Circuit concluded
that it was not required to apply Chinese conflicts law.1"
Why do these two acts contain similar provisions "sup-

"[The district court] found that, under China's choice of law provisions, the law of
the place where the tortious act occurred would apply to suits seeking compensation for
loss caused by tortious acts." Appellee's Brief at 9, Barkanic, 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991)
(No. 562, 90-7641). See supra note 4.
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1988).
" Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 959 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1606).
10 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
1 923 F.2d at 959.
13

Id.
Id.

14

Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)).

12

19 923 F.2d at 959-60.
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planting" punitive damages, if exclusively provided for by the
law of the state where the act or omission occurred, with compensatory damages? The FTCA immunizes the United States
from punitive damages.1" Thus, if the conflicts law of the state
where the act or omission occurred referred to the local law of
that state, and that state's local law provided only punitive damages, absent the supplanting provision the victim of the government's negligence would be without a remedy. Why the similar
supplanting provision in the FSIA? It immunizes the foreign
state from punitive damages. 17 Thus, if whatever conflicts law
the court utilized referred to the local law of the state where the
act or omission occurred, and that state's local law provided only
punitive damages, absent the supplanting provision the victim of
the foreign state's conduct would be without a remedy.
Why does the FSIA immunize the foreign state from punitive damages? There may be at least three reasons. First,
damages designated punitive have rarely been awarded by international tribunals. As explained in MV.
Whiteman, Damages in International Law 716-17 (1937), the international law of damages has developed chiefly in the resolution of claims by one state on behalf of its
nationals against the other state, and the failure to assess exemplary
damages as such against a respondent government may be explained
by the absence of malice or mala mens on the part of an impersonal
government."
Second, Congress may have sensed an impropriety in subjecting
a foreign state to a form of damages under the FSIA that may
not be imposed on the United States under the FTCA. And,
third, Congress may have sensed the impropriety of subjecting a
foreign state to the punitive law of any other state. While in
Barkanic the act or omission occurred within the defendant
state, that, of course, won't always be the case. Whatever conflicts law the forum may utilize could refer to the local law of the
state where the act or omission occurred and that might be some
state other than the defendant state. If that local law provided
only punitive damages, the impropriety of imposing such a punitive law on the defendant state would arise, or the victim of the
1628 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
17 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).

"Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The court, however, did award punitive damages against the private individual defendant. Id.
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defendant state's conduct would be without remedy, absent the
supplanting provision of the FSIA. The reasons underlying the
supplanting provision in the FSIA, complemented by the reasons for that act's immunizing foreign states from punitive damages, suggest to me that the Second Circuit was correct in concluding that the similar supplanting provisions in the two acts
did not require the court hearing an FSIA action to utilize that
conflicts law mandated by the Supreme Court in FTCA actions.
Add to that the fact that the explicit conflicts rule in the FTCA,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Richards, has no counterpart in the FSIA, and the Second Circuit's conclusion that
Richards isn't controlling in FSIA actions is strongly
corroborated.
B. The FSIA and CongressionalIntent
But why does the supplanting section of the FSIA refer to
the possibility of "damages only punitive in nature"' 19 in '"the
20
law of the place where the action or omission occurred?

It

could be asserted that the italicized language strongly implies
that Congress intended that in FSIA actions the local law to be
applied was that of the occurrence state and that Congress simply neglected to include an explicit conflicts rule so providing.
Frankly, I'm just skeptical enough of the ability of Congress to
draft lucid, comprehensive legislation that I'm inclined to extend a certain credence to the argument that the absence of such
an explicit conflicts rule may have been the result of inadvertence. Were I a federal appellate court judge, however, I would
be loath to impute such carelessness to Congress, especially if an
alternative explanation exists. The supplanting provision of the
FSIA, like the similar section of the FTCA, stated more fully
than set forth in the Second Circuit's opinion, provides:
a foreign state ... shall not be liable for punitive damages; if, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place where
the action or omission occurred provides ...

for damages only puni-

tive in nature, the foreign state shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such
death which were incurred by the persons for whose benefit the action

1 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
Id. (emphasis added).

20
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was brought. 1

This language suggests a couple of explanations other than congressional inadvertence. First, it is hornbook law that American
courts view wrongful death actions as creatures of statutes.2 2 For
a wrongful death action to be legally cognizable, there must be
an applicable wrongful death statute in the jurisdiction where
the death-producing injuries were sustained. If such a statute
exists in the occurrence state, but provides only for punitive
damages, absent the supplanting provision, the statute might be
deemed inapplicable to the foreign state immunized from punitive damages simply as a matter of statutory construction. Or, to
put it another way, absent the supplanting provision, such a
wrongful death action against the foreign state might be deemed
not legally cognizable. Second, Congress, having consciously
elected not to legislate an explicit conflicts rule for FSIA actions,
recognized that whatever conflicts law the court utilized might
refer to the local law of the occurrence state. If that state's
wrongful death statute provided for punitive damages only, absent the supplanting provision, the foreign state would be immunized from liability to the decedent's dependent survivors as a
result of the choice-of-law conclusion thus achieved.
Neither of these explanations imputes any inadvertence to
Congress. On the contrary, each imputes to Congress a rather
sophisticated insight, the first with regard to American jurisprudence and the second with regard to the choice-of-law process.
Each of these explanations is consistent with the conclusion that
the supplanting provision of the FSIA does not imply a congressional intent that the court apply the local law of the occurrence
state in every case or even in every wrongful death action. Apparently the Second Circuit was correct in its conclusion that, in
enacting the FSIA, Congress did not explicitly or implicitly impose any conflicts law on courts.
Might it be argued that the portion of the supplanting provision which asserts that "the foreign state shall be liable for
actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary in-

21

28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).

2"The

common law not only denied a tort recovery for injury once the tort victim

had died, it also refused to recognize any new and independent cause of action in the
victim's dependents or heirs for their own loss at his death." KEnro nr AL., supra note
6, § 127, at 945 (footnotes omitted).
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juries resulting from such death which were incurred by the persons for whose benefit the action was brought

23

represents a

congressional decision that the decedent's dependent survivors
are to receive full compensatory damages, .unlimited by any arbitrary ceiling? To one possessing a rather strong plaintiff-oriented bias in personal injury and wrongful death actions (as I
do), the argument has a certain appeal. After all, the statutory
language does provide for actual damages measured by the pecuniary injuries sustained by the survivors.
Ultimately, though, I think the argument should be rejected
for several reasons. First, the language does not explicitly exclude the utilization of any potentially applicable ceiling on recovery. Second, for a court to infer such an exclusion would be
to impute to Congress a-chauvinistic attitude invariably favoring
domestic survivors over a foreign state defendant irrespective of
the reason for the foreign state's limitation and the significance
of that reason in a particular case. This implied jingoism would
seem particularly inept with regard to a statute-the
FSIA-that focuses on circumstances in which a foreign state
may be subjected to the jurisdiction of a federal district court
and does not generally attempt to establish new rules of liability.24 Finally, the other reasons we have identified for the supplanting provision suggest explanations quite apart from establishing unlimited liability in all wrongful death actions.
C. A Federal Conflicts Law: The Search For Uniformity
Well, if the federal court hearing the FSIA action is not required to apply the conflicts law of the foreign state where the
act or omission occurred, is not compelled by congressional implication to apply the local law of that foreign state, and is not
required in all cases to award the survivors unlimited damages,
should the court, in determining which state's local law to apply,
utilize its own conflicts law or the conflicts law of the forum
state? It could be argued, I suppose, that since an FSIA action is
a federal cause of action, that is, one created by congressional
enactment, the federal court should apply its own (federal) con-3 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
If the foreign state is subject to jurisdiction under the FSIA, it is to be liable "in

2

the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances
....
" 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
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flicts law. Indeed, that argument has been accepted judicially.
"[J]urisdiction in this case is based on FSIA, not diversity ....
Therefore, federal common law applies to the choice of law rule
determination."2 5 There are, however, several problems with
that conclusion.
First, the FSIA recognizes the existence of concurrent jurisdiction; such an action may be brought in either a federal or a
state court.26 This suggests that while the FSIA may be necessary to provide subject matter jurisdiction to Article m courts,27
the congressionally recognized continuing capacity of state
courts to entertain actions against foreign states may make the
"federal" characterization of such actions more theoretical than
practical. If such an action is brought in a state court and that
court finds itself confronted with a choice-of-law problem, it
seems unlikely that the state court will utilize a federal conflicts
law, rather than the court's state conflicts law, to resolve the
problem, absent a Supreme Court mandate to the contrary, and
such a mandate seems equally unlikely.28 Thus, if the federal
court utilizes federal conflicts law and the state court utilizes
state conflicts law, the different forums may well achieve inconsistent choice-of-law results. This would be an unseemly consequence of the federal court's utilization of federal conflicts law
in FSIA actions.
Second, as the Second Circuit noted, the FSIA provides that
"the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 29
Had all of the parties in Barkanic been private individuals in
federal court because of diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Kaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.30 would
have required the court to resolve the choice-of-law issue precisely as it would be resolved by the highest appellate court of
the forum state, New York. Or, as the Second Circuit put it in
terms more specific to Barkanic: "To ensure identity of liability
between CAAC and a private defendant.., the court should...
appl[y] New York's choice of law rules even though CAAC is an

"

Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S. - de C.V., 930 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1991).
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1992); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988).
U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
See infra note 33.

2928 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
-o 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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instrumentality of a foreign state.""1

The Second Circuit addressed only in a footnote3 2 the congressional decision and underlying reason to permit a foreign
state sued in state court to remove the action to a federal court.
When Congress enacted the FSIA, it also amended the removal
statute by adding subsection (d): "Any civil action brought in a
State court against a foreign state as defined in [the FSIA] may
be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending" ...., The underlying rationale

for that amendment was that "[i]n view of the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this area, it is important to
give foreign states clear authority to remove to a Federal forum
actions brought against them in the State courts.

3

4

There is a

striking facial inconsistency between the Second Circuit's decision to utilize the conflicts law of the forum state and the congressional desire to achieve uniformity by providing for removal
to federal courts "in view of the potential sensitivity of actions
against foreign states.

' 35

While it's true that the Second Cir-

cuit's conclusion would achieve uniformity as between state and
federal courts sitting in the same state, it would hardly achieve
the federal uniformity apparently sought by Congress. Can that
facial inconsistency by resolved?
Perhaps a more basic question should be asked: If Congress
desired uniformity among federal courts, why did it not enact a
conflicts law to be applied by federal courts hearing FSIA ac923 F.2d 957, 960 (2d Cir. 1991).
923 F.2d at 959-60 n.2.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988). In view of the ability of a foreign state sued in a state
court to remove the action to a federal court, and in view of the conclusions achieved in
this article as to the propriety of using state conflicts rules to resolve post-jurisdiction
choice-of-law problems in FSIA actions, see infra text accompanying notes 37-55. There
seems little purpose in having the Supreme Court require state courts hearing such actions to resolve choice-of-law problems under some federal conflicts law. If the choice-oflaw problem relates to a post-jurisdiction issue, the state court's use of its own conflicts
law would be entirely appropriate. Even if the choice-of-law problem went to a jurisdictional issue, and the foreign state had failed to remove the action to federal court, it
could be said that the foreign state had "waived" its right to have the issue resolved by
the application of some federal conflicts law.
1,H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6631.
35 Id.
31

32
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tions? Earlier on we asked why Congress had not enacted an explicit conflicts law in light of the supplanting provision's reference to "the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."' 36 To that inquiry, we found satisfactory answers
other than mere inadvertence. But now the inquiry must be
more basic. Why did Congress not provide for the uniformity it
apparently desired by enacting an explicit conflicts law for application by all federal courts hearing FSIA actions? The FTCA
provides for liability against the government "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred."37 Obviously, Congress
knows how to fashion a conflicts law when it wishes to do so.
Yet, the FSIA provides that "the foreign state shall be liable in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances" with no conflicts law.38 Seemingly, in
drafting the FSIA, Congress drew upon some of the language of
the FTCA. Consequently, the absence of an explicit conflicts law
in the FSIA hardly seems to have been the -result of inadvertence (even to a skeptic like me). Is it possible that Congress
chose to provide no explicit conflicts law similar to that of the
FTCA because Congress wished to avoid the renuoi interpretation given by the Richards court to the FTCA's conflicts law?
That hardly seems likely. Surely Congress had the capacity to
recognize that it could have avoided such an interpretation simply by inserting one additional word into the conflicts law: "in
accordance with the local law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Then why didn't Congress do so?
The answer may lie in that aspect of FSIA actions where
"the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign states" seems
most likely to be realized and, therefore, where the congressional
desire for uniformity is the most cogent. 9 The most sensitive
aspect of any FSIA action is whether the foreign state defendant
may be subjected to the jurisdiction of a federal district court.
Indeed, "[t]he purpose of the [FSIA] is to provide when and
3828 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
37 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
-28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
9 HR. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.AN. 6604, 6631.
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how parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its
entities in the courts of the United States and to provide when a
foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity. ' 40 The FSIA was
intended to codify the "restrictive ' ' 41 principle of sovereign immunity, presently recognized in international law, limiting the
immunity of a foreign state to "suits involving [its] public acts
(jure imperii) and not [extending such immunity] to suits based
on its commercial or private acts (jure gestionis).'' 2
A principal purpose of [the FSIA] is to transfer the determination of
sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch,
thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions are
made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due
process."'

It is in making the basic determination of jurisdiction over a foreign state that FSIA actions present the most sensitive issue and
where uniformity among federal courts is most important.
The Supreme Court in First National City Bank v. Banco
ParaEl Comercio Exterior de Cuba44 noted that "where state
law provides a rule of liability governing private individuals, the
FSIA requires the application of that rule to foreign states in
like circumstances. '45 But, the Court added, the FSIA "is silent.
. concerning the rule governing the attribution of liability
among entities of a foreign state. ' 46 In this latter instance, implicating the act of state doctrine, the issue is not to be resolved
47
by "divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations.
There "Congress expressly acknowledged 'the importance of developing a uniform body of law' concerning the amenability of a
foreign sovereign to suit in United States courts. '48 In that sensitive area, the Court concluded, the "governing" 49 principles
"are common to both international law and federal common law,

10 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604.
41 Id. at 7.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44

462 U.S. 611 (1983).

5 Id. at 622 n.11.
41
47

48
49

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964)).
Id. at 622 n.11.
Id. at 623.
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which... is necessarily informed both by international law principles and by articulated congressional policies."110
This affords a wholly rational explanation for the absence of
an explicit conflicts law in the FSIA, notwithstanding the congressional desire for uniformity. If the need for uniformity is
most important with regard to the jurisdictional issue, and that
issue is to be resolved by a combination of international law and
federal common law, with the latter informed by international
law principles and congressional policies, how would that explicit conflicts law read? I suppose Congress could have provided
that "in resolving the jurisdictional issue, federal courts are to
apply a combination of international law and federal common
law, with the latter informed by international law principles and
congressional policies." Perhaps that would havebeen preferable
to the lacuna actually created by Congress which has generated
the divergent results achieved by the various circuits.5 1 Still,
such a conflicts law would have been one legislative mouthful,
and a mouthful necessarily followed by another conflicts law to
be applied to post-jurisdiction issues. All of that, I think, would
be too much to expect of Congress.
The Second Circuit, although addressing the amendment to
the removal statute and the congressional desire for uniformity
underlying that amendment only in a footnote, did pick up on
the Supreme Court's opinion in Banco Para and the distinction
between jurisdictional and post-jurisdiction issues5 2 Since the
application or non-application of the Chinese ceiling on recovery
was a post-jurisdiction liability issue, the Second Circuit concluded that the issue was to be resolved by the application of the
forum state's conflicts law.53
Is there an undue awkwardness in utilizing an informed federal conflicts law in resolving the jurisdictional issue and then
using the conflicts law of the forum state in resolving post-jurisdiction issues? The Ninth Circuit has so concluded:
If a different choice of law rule applied to determine the ...

jurisdic-

50 Id.
11 Compare Barkanic, 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991) with Schoenberg v. Exportadora
de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 930 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1991) and with Liu v. Republic of China, 892
F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989). See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
52
3

Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 959-60 n.2.
Id. at 959-60.
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tional [issue from that used to resolve issues on the merits], it would
be cumbersome, present grave difficulties, and could result in different
substantive laws being applied in the same suit. We do not believe
that Congress intended different choice of law rules to apply. We
therefore hold that the federal choice of law rule controls... both for
jurisdiction under the FSIA and on the merits."

Is the complaint justified? I think not. If, in resolving the jurisdictional issue, the court utilizes federal law, informed by international law principles and congressional policies (as suggested
by the Supreme Court in Banco Para),the court will decide that
jurisdiction does or does not exist. If it does not exist, the court
will confront no choice-of-law problems on the merits. If jurisdiction does exist, and the court confronts a choice-of-law problem on the merits, resolving that problem by applying the conflicts law of the forum state would seem to be entirely consistent
with the congressional intent that the foreign state be treated
"as a private individual under like circumstances."' ,5 Thus, using
an informed federal conflicts law to resolve jurisdictional issues
would seem to achieve the uniformity sought by Congress in that
sensitive area and utilizing the forum state's conflicts law to resolve post-jurisdiction issues would achieve the "private individual"5 6 result sought by Congress in that less sensitive area.
Should that dual approach result in the application of one
state's local law in resolving the jurisdictional issue and another
state's local law in resolving the post-jurisdiction issue, there
would be no inherent impropriety. Depecage has become commonplace5 7 and this particular depecage would be one entirely
consistent with the apparent congressional intent with regard to
each issue.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit, in concluding that federal
conflicts law should be exclusively utilized in FSIA actions, identified that federal conflicts law as the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws.58 I suppose that, as a general proposition, each

1 Liu, 892 F.2d at 1426.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
M

Id.

See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.4, at 71
(3d ed. 1986); Stutsman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atl. States, Inc., 546
A.2d 367, 373 (D.C. 1988) ("[T]he issue-by-issue approach of interest analysis makes it
far more likely that the law of one jurisdiction will be found to govern one aspect of a
case while the law of another jurisdiction will control another aspect of that case.").
8 Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 930 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1991).
'
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circuit has a right to embrace whatever conflicts law it wishes.
For example, the Second Circuit in a recent opinion seemed to
embrace as its federal conflicts law one "invok[ing] similar considerations" as New York's interest analysis."" This freedom of
choice, however, strikes me as inappropriate in resolving a jurisdictional issue under the FSIA. In this sensitive area, Congress
has indicated a strong desire for uniformity, amending the removal statute as one means of achieving that uniformity. Consequently, federal courts confronting a choice-of-law problem with
regard to such a jurisdictional issue should follow the lead of the
Supreme Court and apply as the appropriate conflicts law federal law, informed by both international law principles and congressional policies, rather than the federal conflicts law each circuit might utilize in other contexts.
If this is done, and jurisdiction under the FSIA is found to
exist, the court would be virtually compelled to utilize some
other conflicts law in resolving post-jurisdiction choice-of-law
problems. It seems fairly clear that the FSIA was not intended
to change the substantive law applicable to foreign states; they
are to be treated in the same manner "as a private individual
under like circumstances." 60 Consequently, the court confronting
a choice-ol-law problem with regard to a post-jurisdiction issue
could hardly apply a conflicts law informed by congressional policies. Necessarily, therefore, the court would utilize one conflicts
law to resolve jurisdictional issues and a different conflicts law to
resolve post-jurisdiction issues. That dual approach, found
"cumbersome" by the Ninth Circuit, is not only appropriate, but
apparently required to remain true to the different congressional
intentions applicable to the sensitive area of jurisdiction and the
non-sensitive area where the foreign state is to be treated "as a
private individual." 6' 1 As the Supreme Court implied in Banca
Para and the Second Circuit concluded in Barkanic, choice-oflaw problems going to non-sensitive post-jurisdiction issues
should be resolved by application of the conflicts law of the forum state, just as they would be if the foreign state were a private individual. The Second Circuit's decision to resolve the
" Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723, 726 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
district court opinion at 695 F. Supp. 1450, 1453-54 (1988)).
28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
61 Id.
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choice-of-law problem before it pursuant to the conflicts law of
the forum state, New York, seems to me to have been precisely
correct.
II.

IDENTIFYING NEW YORK'S CONFLICTS LAW

Having concluded that New York's conflicts law was to be
applied in resolving the choice-of-law issue in Barkanic how did
the Second Circuit interpret that law? The court reviewed the
choice-of-law decisions of the New York Court of Appeals from
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.6 2 through Schultz v. Boy
Scouts of America, Inc.6 3 The Second Circuit concluded that,
prior to Schultz, the New York court had adopted interest anal6 4
ysis as its method for resolving choice-of-law problems.
How would interest analysis have worked in Barkanic? Presumfably the reason underlying the Chinese law limiting an airline's liability for the wrongful death of a non-citizen to $20,000
was to protect the economic integrity of China Airlines. Since
the defendant was the surrogate for that airline, that reason for
the Chinese ceiling on recovery would convert into a significant
interest on the part of China in having its ceiling applied. The
reason underlying the laws of the District of Columbia and New
Hampshire, neither imposing any ceiling on wrongful death action recoveries, presumably is to assure that decedent's dependent survivors do not become indigent wards of those states.;

9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S. 133 (1961).
65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
"Although Kilberg was decided before New York adopted an 'interest analysis'
approach to choice of law questions in Babcock v. Jackson ... after Babcock New York
courts continued to hold that the law of decedent's domicile governs the issue of damages in wrongful death actions." Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 962 (citations omitted).
6' In 1885 Congress enacted the Wrongful Death Act for the Distr District of Columbia, which is now codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2701 et. seq (1981). The statute
confers a right to bring an action for wrongful death upon only one person, the "personal
representative of the deceased person," id., § 16-2702, who may pursue such an action for
the sole benefit of "the spouse and the next of kin of the deceased person." Id., § 162701. Cole, Raywid & Braverman v. Quadrangle Dev., 444 A.2d 969, 971 (D.C. 1982)
(citations and footnotes omitted).
[The District of Columbia Wrongful Death Act] is designed to provide a remedy whereby close relatives of the deceased, who might naturally have expected
maintenance or assistance from the deceased had he lived, may recover compensation from the wrongdoer commensurate with the loss sustained. Thus,
proper recovery under this Act is based on the pecuniary benefits that the statutory beneficiaries might reasonably be expected to have derived from the de"
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Assuming decedent's dependent survivors were domiciled in
those states,"6 each state's reason would convert into a significant interest on the part of each in having its law applied. Confronted with this true conflict, the court would be compelled to
decide which state's interest in having its law applied was the
more significant and apply the local law of that state. Arguably,
an adverse choice-of-law result would be more likely to cause the
indigence of the dependent survivors than the bankruptcy of the
airline. This would suggest that, as between China and the District of Columbia in the Barkanic action, the local law of the
District should be applied and, as between China and New
Hampshire in the Fox action, the local law of New Hampshire
should be applied. But have we done justice to the reasons underlying the Chinese ceiling?
A. Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio
67
Grandense (Varig Airlines)
In Tramontana,the court found that one purpose of a Brazilian ceiling on recoveries in personal injury or wrongful death
actions against Brazil's airline was to protect an enterprise
whose success "is a matter not only of pride and commercial
well-being, but perhaps even of national security.""8 I suppose
that same "national security" concern could be found to be a
reason for the Chinese ceiling in Barkanic. Moreover, the
Tramontana court emphasized that "the Brazilian limitation in
terms applies only to airplane accidents, unlike the Massachusetts provision rejected in Kilberg, which was an across-the-

ceased had he lived.
Senler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C., 575 F.2d 922, 924-25 (D.C. Cir.
1978)(footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the New Hampshire wrongful death statute, see supra note 6.
While Donald Fox's wife was domiciled in New Hampshire, Peter Barkanic,
though domiciled in the District of Columbia, was a bachelor who left no dependent
survivors domiciled in the District. The plaintiff in the Barkanic action was the decedent's mother, domiciled in Maryland. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. At
this point in the text, I am assuming, contrary to fact, that Barkanic's dependent survivors were domiciled in the District of Columbia for the purpose of engaging in interest
analysis based on that assumption. Subsequently in the text, I shall consider how the
domicile in Maryland of Barkanic's mother might influence that interest analysis. See
infra note 71 and accompanying text.
350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Id. at 471.
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board ceiling on recovery for wrongful death in that state. The
focus of Brazilian concern could hardly be clearer."6 9 This specificity suggested an enhanced interest on the part of Brazil in
having its ceiling applied. Again, the same could be said of the
Chinese ceiling in Barkanic; it is applicable only to airline liability. On the other hand, the no-ceiling laws of the District of Columbia and New Hampshire are of general applicability in all
wrongful death actions. Consequently, following the lead of
Tramontana, and considering both China's national security interest and the specificity of its ceiling law, interest analysis
might lead to the conclusion that China had a more significant
interest in the application of its ceiling law than either the District or New Hampshire had in applying its no-ceiling law.
In Tramontana, the court, utilizing interest analysis, also
noted that Maryland, the domicile state of the dependent survivors, retained lex loci delicti as its conflicts rule in tort actions.
Consequently, if the action had been brought in a Maryland
court, that court would have imposed the Brazilian ceiling even
to the economic jeopardy of the Maryland dependent survivors.
From that, the court inferred a diminished interest on the part
of Maryland in protecting its dependent survivors: if a Maryland
court would not disregard Brazilian law for the benefit of one of
its own residents in a suit brought there, why should a court
sitting in the District of Columbia do so at the expense of substantial and legitimate interests of Brazil? 7°
In the Barkanic action, although decedent had been domiciled in the District of Columbia, the plaintiff was decedent's
mother, a domiciliary of Maryland. 7 ' Since decedent had been a
bachelor, he left no widow or children and no other dependent
survivors domiciled in the District. 2 Rather, his mother-the
69 Id.
70 Id. at 475. I confess that I am aware of no opinion of the New York Court of
Appeals that considered the conflicts law of an interested state other than the forum in
resolving a choice-of-law problem through interest analysis. I have considered this aspect
of Tramontana only for the sake of completeness and in light of the possibility that
some time in the future the New York court might follow suit.
7 Telephone conversation with Daniel F. Hayes, Esq., counsel for the plaintiffs. Mr.
Barkanic is survived by his mother, Louise Kimball of Annapolis, Maryland, a brother,
Stephen A., of New York City, New York, and three sisters, Donna L. Barkanic of Tucson, Arizona, and Lucie M. and Mary A. Barkanic, both of Annapolis, Maryland. See
Obituaries, WASH. PosT, Jan. 28, 1985, at D4.
72 Id.
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dependent survivor-was a Maryland domiciliary." s Again following the lead of Tramontana, and noting that Maryland retains lex loci delicti,74 if the Barkanic action had been brought
before a Maryland court, that court presumably would have imposed the Chinese ceiling even to the economic jeopardy of the
Maryland dependent survivor. This would suggest further that
in Barkanic China had the more significant interest in applying
its local law imposing the ceiling. Consequently, interest analysis
could very well have led to the conclusion that the Chinese ceiling should have been applied in Barkanic.
B.

5
Rosenthal v. Warren7 and Neumeier v. Kuehner a

In Barkanic, the Second Circuit, in reviewing New York's
application of interest analysis before Schultz, considered several cases involving a choice-of-law problem as to the application
of the no-ceiling wrongful death statute of the domicile state of
the dependent survivors or the application of the ceiling law of
the occurrence state. In each case, the New York court had concluded that the state of domicile had the greater interest in the
application of its law, therefore the court applied the no-ceiling
local law. 77 In none of those cases, however, was there any "national security" interest on the part of the occurrence state and
in each case the ceiling law applied "across-the-board" with no
particular activity given that unique protection.
The Second Circuit also considered its own pre-Schultz
opinion in Rosenthal v. Warren.7s There, the court, exercising
diversity jurisdiction, was required to make an educated judicial
guess as to whether the New York Court of Appeals would apply
the no-ceiling law of the dependent survivor's domicile or the
ceiling law of the occurrence state. In Rosenthal, the court considered Neumeier v. Kuehner.7" In Neumeier, the New York

73

Id.

Jacobs v. Adams, 505 A.2d 930 (Md. CL Spec. App.), cert. denied sub. noma., Stephenson v. Tseronis, 505 A.2d 260 (Md. 1986).
475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China, 923
F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1991).
78 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). The opinion in Rosenthal, like that in Barkanic, was written by Judge Oakes.
,9 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
7'
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Court of Appeals adopted three rules for resolving the choice-oflaw problems regarding the application of an asserted guest statute.8 0 Ultimately, the Neumeier court applied the guest statute
of the occurrence state. In Rosenthal, however, the Second Circuit concluded that "[i]n no way ... did the [Neumeier] court
retreat from the position it had staked out in Kilberg and
Miller, refusing to apply other states' wrongful death limitations
in the case of a New York domiciliary." 81 Consequently, the Second Circuit in Rosenthal concluded that the New York Court of
Appeals would apply the no-ceiling law of New York, the domicile of the dependent survivor.
82
Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.

C.

But then came Schultz. The Second Circuit read Schultz as
"suggest[ing] ... that Rosenthal is no longer an accurate inter83
pretation of New York law."
In Schultz, the court applied the first and third Neumeier rules to
dismiss a wrongful death suit pursuant to a New Jersey statute rendering charitable entities immune from suit.... In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that "rules ... limiting damages in wrongful
death actions, vicarious liability rules, [and] immunities from suit,"
should all be governed under the same choice of law analysis.... As
such, it appears to us that New York courts would now apply the

These are the three rules of Neumeier.
(1) When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same
state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and
determine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
(2) When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that
state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held
liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the
tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was
injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver
who has come into that state should not-in the absence of special circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
(3) In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in
different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable
rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred but not if
it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the
relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the
multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
Neumeier, 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
81 Rosenthal, 475 F.2d at 442.
82 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
83 Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of People's Republic of China, 923 F.2d
957, 963 (2d Cir. 1991) (footnote omitted).
8
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Neumeier rules to all post-accident loss distribution rules, including
rules that limit damages in wrongful death cases..
.. Accordingly,
based on the second Neumeier rule, we affirm the district court's application of Chinese law."

I confess that Schultz has always been something of an
enigma to me. The Schultz family was domiciled in New Jersey
where the two sons, Richard, aged 13, and Christopher, 11, attended parochial school and were members of a local Boy Scout
troop. One of their school teachers was Brother Edmund
Coakeley, supplied by the Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis,
Inc., under an agreement between the Archdiocese of Newark
and the Franciscan Brothers. Coakeley was also the Scoutmaster
of the Boy Scout troop to which the boys belonged. The complaint alleged that, during two campouts in New York, Coakeley
sexually abused each of the boys, continued to abuse Christopher upon their return to New Jersey, and threatened both boys
with harm if they revealed what had occurred. As a result of
Coakeley's alleged conduct, Christopher committed suicide,
Richard sustained severe emotional distress, and their parents
sustained severe emotional distress. Wrongful death and personal injury actions were brought against the Boy Scouts and
the Franciscan Brothers, alleging negligent hiring and supervision. Asserting New Jersey's charitable immunity law, both defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs resisted the
motion, arguing that New York law, repudiating charitable immunity, should be applied. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed, and ultimately the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. s
The Court of Appeals noted that it had utilized interest
analysis in resolving choice-of-law problems."0 The court also
noted, however, that in Neumeier v. Kuehner it had embraced
three rules for resolving choice-of-law problems involving guest
statutes. These rules apparently were intended to codify (my
word) and simplify the interest analysis methodology in guest
statute cases. In Schultz, the court concluded that these three
rules were intended to apply to all choice-of-law problems in-

84

Id. (emphasis added).

Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 192-94, 480 N.E.2d at 681-82, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 92-93.
, Id., 65 N.Y.2d at 196-97, 480 N.E.2d at 683-84, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 94-95.
87 Id., 65 N.Y.2d at 197, 480 N.E.2d at 684, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 95; see supra note 80.
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volving conflicting laws that "relate to allocating losses that result from admittedly tortious conduct.., such as those limiting
damages in wrongful death actions, vicarious liability rules, or
immunities from suit ... ."88 Finding that the conflicting laws of
New Jersey and New York were such loss allocation rules, the
court applied rule one (involving litigants having a common
domicile) to the actions against the Boy Scouts and rule three
(involving litigants having different domiciles) to the actions
against the Franciscan Brothers. Both rules led the Schultz
court to apply the local law of New Jersey that recognized charitable immunity.
The lone dissenter was the only member of the court to discern a conduct-regulating reason underlying New York's law
that rejected charitable immunity. Since the sexually abusive
conduct-the ultimate consequence of the defendants' alleged
negligent hiring and supervision-had been initiated in New
York, the dissent found that underlying reason converted into a
significant interest on the part of New York in having its law
applied. Not surprisingly, the dissent concluded that New York's
interest in the application of its law, intended to protect and
preserve human life, was more significant than New Jersey's admittedly legitimate interest in protecting the economic integrity
of charities, thereby encouraging their good works in that
state.89
The first aspect of Schultz that continues to puzzle me is
why only one member of the court perceived a conduct-regulating reason underlying New York's repudiation of charitable immunity. As the dissent noted, in the very case in which New
York had rejected that doctrine, the court offered two reasons
for its conclusion that respondeat superior should be imposed on
charities as well as all other employers: "insistence upon respondeat superior and damages for negligent injury serves a two-fold
purpose, for it both assures payment of an obligation to the person injured and gives warning that justice and the law demand
the exercise of care."9 This italicized language makes it rather
88Id., 65 N.Y.2d at 198, 480 N.E.2d at 685, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
89 Id., 65 N.Y.2d at 205-12, 48 N.E.2d at 690-94, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 101-5.

90 Id., 65 N.Y.2d at 208, 480 N.E.2d at 691-92, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 103, quoting Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957) (emphasis added
in Schultz).
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clear that New York's rejection of charitable immunity was intended to have a conduct-regulating purpose. Had the other
members of the Schultz court recognized that conduct-regulating reason, they could not have characterized New York's law as
simply one "relat[ing] to allocating losses that result from admittedly tortious conduct . .. " thereby making "less important"92 New York's "admonitory interest. 9 3 Rather, had the

majority discerned New York's conduct-regulating interest, presumably New York, as the state where the sexually abusive conduct was initiated, would have had "a predominant, if not exclusive, concern... because [of its] interest ...

in the admonitory

effect that applying its law [would] have on similar conduct in
the future ...

[which concern would] outweigh any interests of

the common-domicile jurisdiction [of New Jersey]."'' °
The second aspect of Schultz that puzzles me is how to interpret the choice-of-law technique utilized by the court. Did the
majority repudiate interest analysis or did it merely utilize the
three rules of Neumeier as a simplified manner of applying interest analysis to competing laws viewed by the court as being
aimed exclusively at loss allocation? I suppose that Barkanic
could be read as implying the former conclusion. After noting
that before Neumeier the New York court had "adopted an 'in93 Barkanic
terest analysis' approach to choice of law questions,"1
concluded that Neumeier "directed courts to apply the law of
the place of the accident unless the plaintiff and defendant were
domiciliaries of the same state."96 That sounds like lex loci
delicti generally, with lex domicilii as the potential alternative.
Yet Barkanic itself noted that Schultz directed the application
of lex domicilii only where the competing laws went exclusively
to loss allocation, for example, "rules .

.

. limiting damages in

wrongful death actions, vicarious liability rules, [and] immunities from suit, '9 7 none going to conduct regulation, at least in

the view of the Schultz majority.
1
92

Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 198, 480 N.E.2d at 685, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
Id.

93 Id.

Id., 65 N.Y.2d at 198, 480 N.E.2d at 684-85, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 95.96.
"Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China, 923
F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1991).
96 Id.

97 Id. at 963.
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But if one of the competing laws has an underlying purpose
of conduct regulation, and that law exists in the state where the
conduct occurred, what does Schultz mandate? Schultz seems to
say lex loci delicti: in those circumstances "the locus jurisdiction's interests ... [will] outweigh any interests of the commondomicile jurisdiction .... ."" It's true, of course, that a state's
interest in conduct regulation, an interest aimed at protecting
and preserving human life, must be afforded a high priority. 9
Does that mean that interest must prevail over any competing
interest of the other state, whether or not the common domicile? 100 And what if the other state's competing law is also aimed
at protecting and preserving human life?' 01 Should Schultz be
read as invariably requiring application of the conduct-regulating law of the locus state? I am inclined to think not. In describing the development of New York conflicts law, Schultz noted
that "[i]nterest analysis became the relevant analytical approach
to choice of law in tort actions .... Under this formulation, the
significant contacts are, almost exclusively, the parties' domiciles
and the locus of the tort . .".1."2
It was this interpretation of
interest analysis and the majority's characterization of New
York's and New Jersey's laws as loss allocation rules that led
Schultz to the application of New Jersey's law. Given competing
state laws, both aimed at protecting and preserving human life, I
am not sure that any of Neumeier's three rules would be, or
were intended to be, applicable. Consequently, I am inclined to
read Schultz not as a repudiation of interest analysis, but rather
as an application of that methodology "simplified" by
Neumeier's three rules to a case in which the court concluded
that those rules were applicable.

98

Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 198, 480 N.E.2d at 684-85, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 95-96.

David E. Seidelson, Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems Through Interest Analysis in PersonalInjury Actions: A Suggested Order of Priority Among Competing State
Interests and Among Available Techniques for Weighing Those Interests, 30 DUQ. L.
REv. 869, 875 (1992).

100 Id.
201 Id.
"02

Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 197, 480 N.E.2d at 684, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
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D. Barkanic v. Gen. Admin.
of Civil Aviation of the People's
03
Republic of China'
How does all of that relate to Barkanic? It's fairly apparent
that China's ceiling on recovery is a loss allocation rule. If the
laws of the District of Columbia and New Hampshire, neither
imposing a ceiling on wrongful death action recoveries, are also
loss allocation rules, then, under Schultz, which local law should
be applied? It can't be that of the common domicile since the
defendant is domiciled in China and the two decedents were
domiciled in different states of the United States. Consequently,
Neumeier's second rule would seem to come into play. Since the
defendant's conduct occurred in its domicile (China) and that
state imposes a ceiling on recovery, Chinese law should be applied. And, of course, that's precisely the result achieved by the
04
Second Circuit.1
But suppose that the unlimited recovery laws of the District
of Columbia and New Hampshire had two underlying reasons:
(1) to assure that dependent survivors domiciled in those states
did not become indigent wards and (2) to deter culpable conduct
threatening the lives of domiciliaries of those states, that is, conduct regulation. 0 5 What then? Well, in the first place, the result
in Schultz would no longer be controlling. This result grew out
of the majority's disinclination to perceive a conduct-regulating
reason underlying New York's rejection of charitable immunity.
Second, the assumption of Schultz that such an "admonitory
10 7
interest"'10 6 can arise only on behalf of the "locus jurisdiction"
would be demonstrably disproven. Third, the language of Schultz suggests that an admonitory interest (perhaps on the part
of any state) generated by a conduct-regulating law would outweigh any competing interest. Of course, the competing interest
before the Schultz court, and apparently the only competing interest contemplated by the court, was New Jersey's interest in
protecting the economic integrity of the defendant charities. As
our earlier interest analysis suggested, China's interest in pro-

103
104

923 F.2d 957, 963 (2d Cir. 1991).
Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 963.

103 See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974); Johnson v. Spider
Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997 (Wash. 1976).
10 Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 198, 480 N.E.2d at 684-85, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
107 Id., 65 N.Y.2d at 198, 480 N.E.2d at 684, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
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tecting its airline may go beyond mere economic concern and
encompass national security concerns. As between those competing interests, protecting and preserving human life on the part
of decedents' domiciles and national security on the part of the
defendant's domicile, which should prevail? Schultz, of course,
never confronted that conflict. And none of Neumeier's three
rules contemplated such a conflict. After all, those three rules,
even as perceived by the Schultz court, which gave the rules an
application far beyond guest statute cases, govern only conflicts
between loss allocation laws. How would the New York Court of
Appeals (and therefore the Second Circuit in Barkanic) resolve
that conflict?
I think the New York court would feel compelled to engage
in interest analysis to resolve that choice-of-law problem.
Clearly, the "admonitory" concern represented by the no-ceiling
laws of the decedents' domiciles, aimed at protecting and preserving human life, would be entitled to a high priority. Yet
China's law, directed toward a national security interest, also
implicates the protection and preservation of human life-as
many as one billion lives. Which represents the more significant
interest? I'm inclined to think that the New York Court of Appeals (and therefore the Barkanic court) would find China's interest to be the more significant and would apply its ceiling on
wrongful death action recoveries.
Thus, two conclusions emerge. First, given the limited applicability of the three Neumeier rules, even as applied in Schultz,
those rules cannot be dispositive of all choice-of-law problems in
tort actions. With regard to those problems unresolved by the
three rules, the foundation of those rules and the pre-existing
"relevant analytical approach to choice of law in tort actions,"
interest analysis subsists in New York. Second, even had the
Second Circuit in Barkanic utilized interest analysis and even if
the no-ceiling laws of the District and New Hampshire had an
underlying conduct-regulation reason, given the national security interest of China, the Second Circuit may still have imposed
the Chinese ceiling.
Does either the District of Columbia or the New Hampshire
law have the kind of underlying conduct-regulating reason we
hypothesized above? Apparently not. Although the highest appellate courts of at least a couple of states have found such a
reason for their no-ceiling wrongful death action damage provi-
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sions, 10 8 neither the District nor the New Hampshire courts
have. In their view, apparently, the unlimited recovery provisions are intended only to protect domiciled dependent survivors
from indigence. In these circumstances, Barkanic presented the
Second Circuit with competing laws concerned only with loss allocation or, with regard to the Chinese ceiling on recovery, loss
allocation and a national security interest aimed at protecting
and preserving human lives. And Schultz indicates, as the
Barkanic court concluded, Neumeier's second rule would point
toward China's ceiling law.
CONCLUSION

The distinction drawn by Barkanic between jurisdictional
issues and post-jurisdiction issues in FSIA actions, with choiceof-law problems going to the former to be resolved by federal
conflicts law informed by international law principles and congressional policies, and choice-of-law problems going to the latter to be resolved by the conflicts law of the forum state, is consistent with the approach suggested by the Supreme Court in
Banco Para.'09 Furthermore, this distinction comports with the
two different congressional intentions reflected by the FSIA:
uniformity as among federal circuits with regard to the sensitive
jurisdictional issues and, with regard to the non-sensitive postjurisdiction issues, treatment of foreign states as "private individuals."110 Consequently, the Second Circuit's decision to resolve the post-jurisdiction extent of liability issue before the
Barkanic court by applying New York's conflicts law seems to
me the correct conclusion. Moreover, having decided to utilize
New York's conflicts law, the Second Circuit's conclusion that,
under Schultz and its simplified form of interest analysis, the
New York Court of Appeals would apply the Chinese ceiling on
recovery also seems to me the correct conclusion.
Both issues confronted by the Second Circuit were difficult.
The first was made difficult because of the absence of any explicit conflicts law in the FSIA and the divergent manifestations
of congressional intent as to jurisdictional and post-jurisdiction
issues. The second was difficult because of the lack of clarity ex108See supra note 105.
109462 U.S. 611 (1983); see supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
110 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
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isting as to the nature of New York's conflicts law, a lack arising
out of the Neumeier-Schultz treatment of interest analysis. In
resolving both issues in a manner consonant with the appropriate legislative and judicial intentions, the Second Circuit earned
for itself kudos and even emulation by the other federal circuits.

